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LEGISLATIVE PRAYER: HISTORICAL TRADITION  
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
 
Chad West* 
 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”1 There is a great 
deal of confusion among scholars, lower federal courts, and the Justices of the 
Supreme Court over appropriate Establishment Clause principles,2 but it is at least 
clear that the government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion 
or religious faith, or tends to do so.”3 It has long been settled that state and local 
legislative bodies may, in harmony with the Establishment Clause, open meetings 
with prayers given by state-employed or volunteer clergy.4 Less clear is whether 
legislators themselves may (1) offer prayers in local government meetings, and (2) 
restrict the opportunity to give prayers to themselves. This Note reviews the history 
of legislative prayer in the United States and the Supreme Court’s decisions about 
clergy-led prayer practices, provides an overview of the current circuit-split on the 
issue of legislator-led prayer, argues that legislator-led prayer cannot be upheld 
under the same analysis used to allow clergy-led prayer, and proposes options for 
resolving the split. 
 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The “first American legislative prayer” was offered at the first Continental 
Congress in 1774 by Reverend Jacob Duché, an Anglican minister from 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.5 The Continental Congress invited him to pray over the 
objection of John Jay and John Rutledge, who thought that the delegates were “so 
divided in religious Sentiments . . . that [they] could not join in the same Act of 
                                                             
* © 2019 Chad West. J.D. Candidate May 2019, University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. Many thanks to the staff of the Utah Law Review for their helpful comments 
and suggestions and to family and friends who have offered their advice and encouragement. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayer, Moments of Silence, 
and the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 724 (2009); Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 
138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”). 
3 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
4 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–91 (1983); see also Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014). 
5 Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1171, 1177 (2009). 
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Worship.”6 John Adams noted that the prayer had a profound positive effect on all 
of the delegates.7 Duché and other chaplains offered prayers for the Continental 
Congress until the Constitutional Convention of 1787.8 The Constitutional 
Convention was starkly different from the Continental Congress with respect to 
legislative prayer.9 Despite Benjamin Franklin’s insistence that chaplain-led prayer 
would guide the Framers as they fashioned a new system of government, there is no 
record of any prayers being offered at the Convention.10 
The First United States Congress, “as one of its early items of business, adopted 
the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with prayer.”11 Soon after, 
the House12 and Senate13 elected chaplains. Because there is no record of the vote 
for the creation of chaplaincies, it is difficult to determine how much consensus 
existed within Congress about legislative prayer and congressional chaplaincies, but 
it is clear that there was at least some disagreement about the matter.14 Despite 
opposition from various groups,15 legislative prayer in Congress has continued 
uninterrupted until today.16 On the state level, many legislatures have long traditions 
of legislative prayer.17 In state legislatures there is wide variation on who offers 
opening prayers, but “[i]n many chambers, it is a tradition for a chaplain to be 
selected to serve the body.”18 
                                                             
6 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, 16 September 1774, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0101 [https://perma.cc/4T9D-
HXDH]. 
7 Id. 
8 Lund, supra note 5, at 1182–83. 
9 Id. at 1183. 
10 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450–52 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911); Lund, supra note 5, at 1183. 
11 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 
(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
12 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788. 
13 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 24 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
14 Lund, supra note 5, at 1184–85 (noting that some votes were cast to protest the 
election of chaplains and that James Madison never gave outright approval to congressional 
chaplaincies); see discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
15 See Lund, supra note 5, at 1196–1202 (explaining that, because of outside pressures, 
Congress briefly suspended their regular chaplaincies in the 1850s and instead invited local 
ministers to pray before congressional proceedings). 
16 See id. at 1213; see also Reverend Patrick J. Conroy, S.J., OFF. CHAPLAIN: U.S. 
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://chaplain.house.gov/archive/index.html?id 
=2854 [https://perma.cc/U48Z-SCQJ] (archiving a recent prayer given in the U.S. House of 
Representatives); Jill Colvin et al., Longest Shutdown Over: Trump Signs Bill to Reopen 
Government, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/30769167ab7a4 
ef9adf880d020b775dd [https://perma.cc/U6Q7-VTLF] (“[A]s the Senate opened with 
prayer, Chaplain Barry Black called on high powers . . . to help senators do ‘what is right.’”). 
17 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 5-
145 (2002), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/02Tab5Pt7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8B54-JF5S]. 
18 Id. at 5-147. 
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II.  GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
 
With this brief history in mind, and taking into account the importance of 
religion to many United States citizens, it is somewhat surprising that the Supreme 
Court did not rule on a case challenging a legislative prayer practice on 
Establishment Clause grounds until Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.19 
 
A.  Marsh v. Chambers – 1983 
 
Ernest Chambers brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 
Nebraska’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer was 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.20 A chaplain, chosen biennially by a state government body, offered 
prayers each day that the legislature was in session and was paid using public 
funds.21 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger framed the issue in Marsh as 
“whether the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a 
prayer by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.”22 The Court upheld the Nebraska practice, reasoning that the practice 
of legislative prayer “is deeply embedded in the history and traditions of this 
country.”23 Chief Justice Burger further explained that, absent an indication that 
legislative prayers were being used “to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief,” the content of specific prayers is not of concern 
to judges.24 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that, given “[t]he unbroken practice” of 
legislative prayer in the United States for over two centuries, the practice was not a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.25 
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that legislative prayer violated the core 
Establishment Clause principle that “[g]overnment in our democracy, state and 
national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.”26 As 
Justice Brennan explained, this neutrality principle helps assure that religious issues 
do not serve as a basis for choosing sides in the political arena.27 When the 
government “declare[s] or act[s] upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view 
on a matter of religion” citizens may feel alienated and cut off from the political 
                                                             
19 Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian 
Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2011). 
20 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 784. 
23 Id. at 786. 
24 Id. at 794–95. 
25 Id. at 795. 
26 Id. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1968)). 
27 Id. at 805. 
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processes of their own government.28 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Brennan 
noted that the Court, by using a historical tradition analysis, sidestepped all of the 
traditional Establishment Clause tests that were in use at the time and “carv[ed] out 
an exception to the Establishment Clause . . . .”29 
 
1.  Traditional Establishment Clause Analysis and the Marsh Carve-Out 
 
If one were to read the Marsh majority opinion without any knowledge of the 
Supreme Court’s previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it would be entirely 
reasonable to conclude that all Establishment Clause issues are analyzed using a 
historical tradition analysis. The Marsh majority mentions the Lemon test,30 “[t]he 
most commonly cited formulation of prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine”31 of 
the day, only once.32 The majority’s brief mention of this landmark decision was 
simply to note that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied the Lemon test 
and found that Nebraska’s chaplaincy practice violated the Establishment Clause.33 
The Marsh majority completely failed to reference Larson v. Valente,34 in which the 
Supreme Court formulated another Establishment Clause test, used to evaluate “state 
program[s] that discriminate[] among religious faiths, and not merely in favor of all 
religious faiths . . . .”35 Much has been written about these and other Establishment 
Clause tests,36 so no space will be dedicated to discussing them here, but it is clear 
that Marsh need not have been decided by using historical tradition.37 Other avenues 
of Establishment Clause analysis were well-established.38 Significantly, Justice 
                                                             
28 Id. at 805–06. 
29 Id. at 796. 
30 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (stating that, to be consistent with 
the Establishment Clause, a government action must meet the following criteria: it must have 
a “secular legislative purpose”; its “principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion”; and it must not “foster an excessive entanglement with 
religion”). 
31 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 786 (majority opinion). 
33 Id. 
34 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
35 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 
(“[W]hen [courts] are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, [they 
must] treat the law as suspect and . . . apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”). 
36 See, e.g., Russell W. Galloway, Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 845, 850–62 (1989) (outlining the primary Establishment Clause tests that 
were in use around the time Marsh was decided). 
37 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796–801 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court 
could have used settled Establishment Clause tests and applying the Lemon test to the facts 
of Marsh). 
38 See Galloway, supra note 36, at 851. 
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Brennan determined that Nebraska’s practice would violate the Establishment 
Clause under Lemon39 and Larson.40 
 
B.  Town of Greece v. Galloway – 2014 
 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of legislative prayer in Town of Greece.41 
In 1999, Greece, a town in upstate New York, began starting its monthly town board 
meetings with a prayer offered by local clergymen.42 To find clergy to give prayers, 
a town employee called local congregations listed in a town directory until she found 
someone willing to pray at the board meeting.43 The town never denied any minister 
the opportunity to pray at a town meeting, but because the vast majority of 
congregations in Greece were Christian, the prayers offered to open meetings often 
invoked Christian themes.44 After Susan Galloway, who attended town board 
meetings to discuss local issues, “complained that Christian themes pervaded the 
prayers,” the town invited clergy from two other faith groups to deliver prayers.45 
Galloway eventually filed suit, claiming that the town’s prayer practice violated the 
Establishment Clause because it sponsored Christian prayers to the exclusion of 
other faiths.46 
Applying Marsh, the Supreme Court held that the Greece’s practice was not in 
violation of the Establishment Clause because it comported with the historical 
tradition of legislative prayer in the United States.47 The Court determined that the 
tradition reflected in Marsh permits chaplains to give prayers as they see fit and that 
sectarian references do not remove prayers from that tradition.48 The Town of Greece 
majority thus confirmed that “a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer 
will not likely establish a constitutional violation” unless, over time, prayers 
“denigrate [nonbelievers], proselytize, or betray an impermissible government 
purpose.”49 The plaintiff in Town of Greece also challenged the town’s prayer 
practice because it coerced participation by non-Christians and others who may not 
have wanted to participate in a prayer ritual.50 The Court did not produce a majority 
holding on the coercion issue and there has been some disagreement about which 
                                                             
39 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any 
group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of 
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”). 
40 Id. at 801 n.11 (“I have little doubt that the Nebraska practice . . . would fail the 
Larson test.”). 
41 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014). 
42 Id. at 570–71. 
43 Id. at 571. 
44 Id. at 571–72. 
45 Id. at 572. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 591–92. 
48 Id. at 582–83. 
49 Id. at 585. 
50 Id. at 586. 
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opinion controls.51 Justice Kennedy determined that Greece’s prayer practice was 
not coercive, but stated that “[t]he analysis would be different if the town board 
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for 
opprobrium,52 or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s 
acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”53 Justice Thomas disagreed, indicating that, 
“to the extent that coercion is relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, it is 
actual legal coercion that counts . . . .”54  
In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that in the United States, “when a citizen 
stands before her government, whether to perform a service or request a benefit, her 
religious beliefs do not enter the picture.”55 In Justice Kagan’s view, a town board 
meeting is different from a meeting of the federal Congress or a state legislature, 
taking it outside of what Marsh recognized as appropriate.56 In town board meetings, 
ordinary citizens have an opportunity to engage with town leaders in an intimate 
setting and petition for town action that could directly affect their day-to-day lives.57 
This is usually not the case in Congress and state assemblies.58 Justice Kagan 
reasoned that prayers in such an intimate setting are very different from the tradition 
outlined in Marsh and could lead some citizens to stop engaging with the local 
democratic process.59 
 
III.  THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT ON LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
 
Marsh and Town of Greece addressed the issue of clergy-led prayer in state 
legislatures and town board meetings.60 Lower federal courts have applied the 
                                                             
51 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“In our 
panel opinion, we were divided regarding whether Justice Kennedy’s three-Justice plurality 
opinion or Justice Thomas’s two-Justice concurring opinion controls . . . on the question of 
coercion.”). 
52 “Public disgrace or ill fame that follows from conduct considered grossly wrong or 
vicious.” Opprobrium, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1986). 
53 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion). 
54 Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA ACT FOR 
ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oct. 31, 1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 85 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)). 
56 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 622–24 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 630–31 (giving the hypothetical example of a Muslim citizen petitioning a 
town board and having to make a choice between joining in a prayer practice she does not 
believe in or not participating and possibly offending the board members that she will soon 
be attempting to persuade). 
60 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (presenting the issue in the case as 
whether a “practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the 
State violates the Establishment Clause . . . .”); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577. 
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standards from these cases, coming to mixed results.61 The issue now making its way 
through the federal court system is whether the identity of the prayer-giver is 
relevant to the constitutionality of legislative prayer practices.62 For the remainder 
of this Note, practices that involve prayers in government meetings given by anyone 
other than a legislator or local commissioner will be referred to as “clergy-led 
prayer” and prayer that is offered by government leaders will be called “legislator-
led prayer” or “lawmaker-led prayer.” 
 
A.  Lund v. Rowan County, North Carolina – 2017 
 
In Lund, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided “whether Rowan 
County’s practice of lawmaker-led sectarian prayer r[an] afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.”63 Rowan County is governed by an elected board of commissioners.64 
During bi-monthly board meetings, the Rowan County commissioners sit at the front 
of the room facing county residents.65 Each board meeting starts with one of the 
commissioners saying “[l]et us pray,” or a similar phrase, followed by a prayer 
offered by a board member.66 The board members take turns offering prayers on a 
rotation system and “[n]o one outside the board is permitted to offer an 
invocation.”67 Board meetings are recorded, and an examination of the years for 
which recordings are available reveals that 97% of the board’s prayers used the 
words “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior.”68 The plaintiffs in Lund, none of whom are 
Christian, actively participated in board meetings to speak about education issues.69 
They brought suit, alleging that the prayer practice “advanced Christianity and 
coerced [them] into participating in religious exercises.”70  
In holding that Rowan County’s prayer practice violated the Establishment 
Clause, the majority in Lund focused on four factors: “commissioners as the sole 
prayer-givers;71 invocations that drew exclusively on Christianity and sometimes 
                                                             
61 Compare Coleman v. Hamilton Cty., 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 888–90 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) 
(concluding that a county’s clergy-led prayer practice did not violate the Establishment 
Clause), with Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cty., 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 536 (W.D. Va. 2015) 
(concluding that a board’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause because it was 
unconstitutionally coercive). 
62 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 537 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Lund v. 
Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
63 Lund, 268 F.3d at 271–72. 
64 Id. at 272. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 273. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 273–74. 
71 Id. at 273–74, 281 (“By arrogating the prayer opportunity to itself, the Board . . . 
restricted the number of faiths that could be referenced at its meetings.”). 
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served to advance that faith;72 invitations to attendees to participate;73 and the local 
government setting.”74 The Fourth Circuit noted that legislator-led prayer could take 
place without creating an Establishment Clause violation,75 but that the combination 
of the abovementioned factors “blur[red] the line between church and state” in a way 
not contemplated by Town of Greece.76 
The dissenting judges in Lund noted that, of the four factors outlined by the 
majority, only the identity of the prayer-giver was distinguishable from Town of 
Greece.77 Noting that Town of Greece made no mention of a requirement for outside 
clergy to give legislative prayers, the dissent claimed that “[p]ractically speaking, 
the public is unlikely to draw any meaningful distinction between a state-paid 
chaplain (Marsh) or state-invited cleric (Town of Greece) and members of the 
legislative body that appoints him.”78 The dissent also relied on historical tradition 
to support legislator-led prayer.79 The South Carolina Provincial Congress, South 
Carolina’s first self-sustaining legislature, regularly allowed its elected members to 
give opening prayers as early as 1775.80 In addition, the dissent noted the 
contemporary prevalence of legislator-led prayer in state and federal government 
meetings.81 In short, the dissent declared that Rowan County’s prayer practice was 
largely indistinguishable from what the Supreme Court dealt with in Town of 
Greece.82 The four factors relied upon by the majority were each constitutional 
standing alone and did not combine to create an Establishment Clause violation.83 
  
                                                             
72 Id. at 281, 284–85 (“Not only did the Board’s invocations convey its singular 
approval of Christianity, the prayer opportunity on occasion served to advance that faith . . . 
by characteriz[ing] Christianity as the one and only way to salvation . . . .”). 
73 Id. at 281, 287 (“[W]hen [phrases like ‘Let us pray’] are uttered by elected 
representatives acting in their official capacity, they become a request on behalf of the 
state.”). 
74 Id. at 281, 287 (“Relative to sessions of Congress and state legislatures, the intimate 
setting of a municipal board meeting presents a heightened potential for coercion. Local 
governments possess the power to directly influence both individual and community 
interests.”). 
75 Id. at 290. 
76 Id. at 281 (quoting Lund v. Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d 407, 435 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting)). 
77 Id. at 306 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 308. 
79 See id. at 308. 
80 Id. at 309. 
81 Id. (noting that a majority of states allow individual legislators to give invocations 
when they request to do so and that United States senators have occasionally delivered 
prayers in meetings of Congress). 
82 Id. at 306. 
83 Id. 
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B.  Bormuth v. County of Jackson – 2017 
 
In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a county’s 
legislator-led prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.84 Jackson 
County, Michigan is governed by an elected board of nine commissioners.85 To start 
monthly board meetings, a commissioner typically asks that the other 
commissioners and the members of the public in attendance “rise and assume a 
reverent position.”86 One of the nine commissioners then says a prayer that is 
“generally Christian in tone . . . .”87 The Plaintiff, a Pagan and Animist, first vocally 
objected to the prayer practice during the public comment portion of a board 
meeting.88 While he was commenting about the prayers, “one of the Commissioners 
‘swiveled his chair and turned his back to [the plaintiff.]’”89 There was a dispute on 
appeal as to whether certain video evidence of the board meetings could be 
considered.90 One video shows a county commissioner calling Bormuth a “nitwit” 
for speaking out against the prayer practice.91 Other commissioners categorized 
Bormuth’s comments as an attack on “my lord and savior Jesus Christ,”92 and “an 
attack on Christianity and Jesus Christ, period.”93 The majority did not consider the 
video evidence because Bormuth’s complaint only referenced the videos’ general 
availability and did not direct the district court to the specific portions on which 
Bormuth was relying.94 The dissent argued that Bormuth drew the district court’s 
attention to the videos, and even if he did not do so correctly, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence required the court of appeals to take judicial notice of them.95 
Relying on many of the same pieces of historical evidence as the dissenting 
justices in Lund, the Bormuth majority determined that the board’s prayer practice 
fit within the historical tradition of legislative prayer as outlined in Marsh and Town 
of Greece.96 The majority also relied on the proposition that legislative prayer exists 
“largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a 
                                                             
84 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 498–99. 
89 Id. at 499. 
90 Id. at 499–501. 
91 Id. at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting); Cty. of Jackson, Personnel & Finance Committee 
November 12, 2013 Jackson County, MI, YOUTUBE 43:29–43:40 (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOOClwZpaXc [https://perma.cc/S3NP-EHFK]. 
92 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
93 Id.; Cty. of Jackson, supra note 91, at 32:50–32:59. 
94 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 500. 
95 Id. at 530–31 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. EVID. 201(b), (c) (noting that 
courts must take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute . . . if a 
party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information”). 
96 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509–10 (referring to legislator-led prayer in the South Carolina 
legislature in 1775). 
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tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”97 Preventing legislators from giving 
prayers detracts from their ability to show what they believe in and set their minds 
to a higher purpose while governing.98 In addition, the majority rejected Bormuth’s 
claim that Jackson County’s prayer practice was coercive, stating that “polite 
requests by [lawmakers] to stand for invocations do not coerce prayer.”99 Similarly, 
incidents where the commissioners spoke negatively about Bormuth were not related 
to his religious beliefs, but were in response to Bormuth’s hostility towards them.100 
Using the “nitwit” clip and other video evidence, the dissent argued that the 
prayer practice was coercive because Bormuth was singled out for opprobrium,101 
but claimed that even without the video evidence, the practice was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.102 In doing so, the dissent invoked many of the same factors 
used by the majority in Lund.103 Finally, the dissent pointed out what it considered 
to be a particularly troubling suggestion by the majority: that if the people of Jackson 
County want a more diverse prayer practice, they can elect commissioners of 
different faiths.104 This idea suggests that it would be permissible for prayer and 
religion to become campaign issues, which is a scenario that the Bill of Rights was 
adopted to prevent.105 
  
                                                             
97 Id. at 511 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 588 (2014) (plurality 
opinion)). 
98 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 511 (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality 
opinion)).  
99 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517 (citing Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 
526 (5th Cir. 2017)). 
100 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 518 (explaining that the commissioners reacted poorly to the 
litigious way in which Bormuth expressed himself, but not to his personal religious beliefs). 
Peter Bormuth does have a history of suing Jackson City and County and has been threatened 
with sanctions by one federal judge. Bormuth v. City of Jackson, No. 12-11235, 2013 WL 
1944574, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2013); see also Court Cases, PETER BORMUTH, 
http://peterbormuth.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/7TCV-2TFV]. 
101 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 539–42 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 537. 
103 Id. at 537–39 (“Legislator-led prayer at the local level falls far afield of the historical 
tradition upheld in Marsh and Town of Greece. The setting—a local government meeting 
with constituent petitioners in the audience—amplifies the importance of the identity of the 
prayer giver in our analysis, and heightens the risks of coercion . . . .”). 
104 Id. at 539. 
105 Id.; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The 
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and 
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.”). 
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C.  The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Rowan County v. Lund – 2018 
 
Both Rowan County and Peter Bormuth appealed these rulings.106 On June 28, 
2018, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases.107 
Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, dissented 
from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Lund and wrote an opinion.108 Stating that 
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis “failed to appreciate the long history of legislator-led 
prayer” in the United States, Justice Thomas acknowledged that he would have 
granted Rowan County’s petition for certiorari and ruled in its favor.109 Justice 
Thomas brought up the example of the South Carolina Provincial Congress (also 
mentioned by the dissenters in Lund) and the fact that “[s]everal States, including 
West Virginia and Illinois, opened their constitutional conventions with prayers led 
by convention members instead of chaplains.”110 Apparently based only on these 
examples, Justice Thomas declared that “[f]or as long as this country has had 
legislative prayer, legislators have led it.”111 
 
IV.  THE PROBLEMS WITH ANALYZING LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER  
UNDER THE MARSH AND TOWN OF GREECE STANDARDS 
 
The majority in Bormuth and the dissenters in Lund analyzed legislator-led 
prayer as if it were the same thing as the clergy-led prayer practices upheld in Marsh 
and Town of Greece.112 One group of dissenters in Lund even stated that “[t]he 
majority’s pro forma distinction of Town of Greece can only be driven by its desire 
to reach a different end, because the nature of Rowan County’s prayer practice 
is . . . virtually indistinguishable from the practice upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Town of Greece.”113 Despite the categorical nature of this assertion, some key 
differences between legislator-led and clergy-led prayer and the potential effects of 
each are easily recognizable. For one, legislator-led prayer poses a much greater 
threat to the democratic process than clergy-led prayer. The most obvious difference, 
the identity of the prayer-giver, is hugely important, because history (the tool used 
by the Supreme Court to evaluate legislative prayer cases114) does not support the 
practice of legislator-led prayer. These differences will be evaluated below. 
                                                             
106 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (No. 
17-565); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 138 S. Ct. 2708 
(2018) (No. 17-7220). 
107 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (denying cert.); Bormuth v. Cty. 
of Jackson, 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (denying cert.). 
108 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
109 Id. at 2565–66. 
110 Id. at 2566. 
111 Id. 
112 Lund, 863 F.3d at 298–99; see Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509. 
113 Lund, 863 F.3d at 299. 
114 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576–77 (2014). 
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A.  Historical Tradition Does Not Support Legislator-Led Prayer 
 
The Supreme Court has determined that “[a]ny test the Court adopts must 
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”115 With this acknowledgement, courts 
must “determine whether the prayer practice [at issue] fits within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”116 Noting that the “[First] Congress 
authorized the appointment of paid chaplains” only three days before they agreed on 
the final language of the Bill of Rights,117 the Marsh majority relied heavily on the 
premise that the Framers of the First Amendment would not have forbidden 
legislative prayer when they had just declared the practice acceptable.118 This 
argument is compelling with respect to clergy-led prayer, but the Lund dissent and 
Bormuth majority misused this analysis and attempted to “shoehorn the legislator-
led prayer . . . issue” into the tradition started by the First Congress.119 The following 
sections will outline the prayer practices used in the Constitutional Convention and 
during the meetings of the First Congress to show that legislator-led prayer is not 
supported by the historical tradition relied upon in Marsh. 
 
1.  The Constitutional Convention 
 
The Establishment Clause was not drafted at the Constitutional Convention,120 
but because many of the delegates at the Convention eventually served on the First 
Congress121 it is useful to analyze their attitudes about legislative prayer.122 There is 
no record of any prayers being offered at the Constitutional Convention.123 On June 
28, 1787, a little over one month after the Convention started, Benjamin Franklin 
lamented that the Convention had made very little progress and suggested that 
                                                             
115 Id. at 577. 
116 Id. 
117 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). 
118 Id. at 790. But see Michael Bhargava, The First Congress and the Supreme Court’s 
Use of History, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1745, 1762 (2006) (noting that this assumption may not hold 
up because many of the actions of the First Congress “may have resulted from political 
compromises or expedients that even many Framers believed to be unconstitutional”). 
119 Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
120 William French Smith, Some Observations on the Establishment Clause, 11 PEPP. 
L. REV. 457, 458–59 (1984) (noting that James Madison, a member of the First Congress, 
drafted and submitted the initial proposal for the Establishment Clause, which was adopted 
after some adjustments by other members of the First Congress). 
121 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (citing Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 
(1888)). 
122 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884). But see 
Bhargava, supra note 118, at 1766 (stating that the Framers of the Constitution only 
constituted a substantial minority of the members of the First Congress). 
123 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787. 
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“henceforth prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our 
deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to 
business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in 
that service.”124 The motion was opposed by Alexander Hamilton and others, and it 
failed to pass.125 It is somewhat unclear why Hamilton and others were unwilling to 
allow a prayer practice, but there is some evidence that delegates were worried that 
starting the practice so late into the Convention could “lead the public to believe that 
embarrassments and dissensions within the convention” had given rise to Franklin’s 
motion.126 It is, however, extremely doubtful that this was the real reason for the 
opposition. “One of the earliest rules established by the Convention restrained the 
members from any disclosure whatever of its proceedings . . . .”127 There is evidence 
that this was a very significant rule and that it was adhered to rigidly.128 Because of 
this, it is somewhat unlikely that Hamilton and others were actually worried about 
what the public might perceive. This assertion is bolstered by the fact that Hugh 
Williamson, a delegate from North Carolina, observed that the true cause of the lack 
of prayer was that “[t]he Convention had no funds” to pay a member of the local 
clergy.129  
The records available from the Convention show that no delegates were 
opposed to the prayer practice itself, they were merely concerned about appearances 
or an inability to get a chaplain.130 Indeed, Benjamin Franklin thought that 
“imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings” was essential because 
without the “concurring aid [of God]” the delegates would not succeed in crafting 
the new government.131 Franklin and others clearly thought that prayers were 
extremely important, and reading Franklin’s passionate speech advocating for prayer 
232 years later, it is logical to ask, why didn’t one of the Framers simply start their 
meetings with a prayer? It seems that the Framers were more willing to accept going 
without an opening prayer than having a delegate to the Convention offer one. 
Perhaps, even at this early stage in the founding of our country, they recognized the 
importance of a principle later articulated by Justice Brennan: that essentially 
                                                             
124 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 450–52. 
125 Id. at 452. 
126 Id. 
127 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, June 10, 1787, 
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/ 
james-madison-to-james-monroe/ [https://perma.cc/5X9V-PBUN]. 
128 Id. (quoting Letter from Robert Burton to John Blount, May 30, 1787, in 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 35 
(James Hutson ed., 1987) (“[T]he Convention sitting here are so very private that there is no 
telling what business they are on . . . .”)). 
129 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 452. 
130 See id. at 452 (noting that Alexander Hamilton and several others thought that 
having prayers might have been proper at the beginning of the convention, but were 
concerned about what the public might think if they started the practice a month after their 
meetings started). 
131 Id. at 451–52. 
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religious issues should remain, to some degree, separate from government activity 
and “not become the occasion for battle in the political arena.”132 In short, there is 
strong evidence from the time of the Framers to suggest that the identity of a prayer-
giver in governmental proceedings is relevant to the legislative prayer analysis. 
 
2.  The First Congress 
 
As noted above, a core assumption relied upon by the Supreme Court in its 
legislative prayer decisions is that, because the “First Congress provided for the 
appointment of chaplains only days after approving language for the First 
Amendment, . . . the Framers considered legislative prayer a benign 
acknowledgement of religion’s role in society.”133 It must first be expressed that, 
though useful in some circumstances, looking to the actions of the First Congress is 
a very problematic tool of constitutional interpretation.134 First, because many 
actions of the First Congress may have been the result of political compromises,135 
it is possible that the results of some of these decisions “may have been one[s] that 
a majority of [the] members of Congress considered unconstitutional.”136 A 1789 
debate on the power of the President to remove officers illustrates this point. In the 
debate, 
 
James Madison led a group, call it A, who believed that the Constitution 
granted removal power to the President alone. He had two groups of 
opponents: B, who thought that Congress, rather than the Constitution, 
determined the issue, and C, who thought that the Constitution provided 
for joint power of removal shared by the executive branch and the Senate 
. . . . Madison engineered two votes on amendments. One vote divided his 
two opponent groups one way (A was joined by B and opposed by C); the 
second vote divided them the other way (A was joined by C and opposed 
by B). The result was that Madison’s group, A, was the only faction to get 
its way both times, so its view prevailed–even though there was no 
majority that supported both amendments proposed by Madison. The 
combined effect of the amendments was to create a congressional 
“decision” suggesting that, as a constitutional matter, the President has the 
sole power to remove executive officials.137 
 
In a 1926 decision, a majority of the Supreme Court used Congress’ 1789 
decision to show “that it was ‘very clear from this history’ that the Framers believed 
                                                             
132 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
133 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014). 
134 Bhargava, supra note 118, at 1745. 
135 Id. at 1762. 
136 Id. at 1777. 
137 Id. (quoting Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 186–87 
(1993)). 
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the President held the sole power to remove officers . . . .”138 This conclusion is 
simply not supported by what actually happened in the vote.139  
Using the actions of the First Congress to inform present-day judicial decisions 
becomes even more difficult when there is little information about the debates and 
votes on bills.140 This is undoubtedly the case with the legislative prayer debate in 
the First Congress.141 No complete record of the vote for the creation of chaplaincies 
has survived,142 making it difficult to know whether there was overwhelming support 
for the proposition or if it was the result of a compromise like the 1789 removal 
power debate. There is, however, evidence of at least some strong dissent to the 
creation of congressional chaplaincies in the First Congress.143 Thomas Paine, who 
was not even living in the United States when the vote was held,144 received three 
votes to be chaplain.145 Because Paine was not available to fill the post and was a 
well-known critic of organized religion, it seems clear that these were votes cast in 
protest of the chaplaincies.146 
Even assuming that acts of the First Congress were believed to be constitutional 
by members of that group and not merely the result of political compromises, it does 
not necessarily follow that “[those actions] are presumptively consistent with the 
Bill of Rights . . . .”147 The classic example supporting this proposition is the passage 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. When the First Congress voted on the Act, none of the 
original Framers or any other member expressed concerns that any portion of it was 
unconstitutional.148 Famously, the Supreme Court found the Judiciary Act 
unconstitutional because it attempted to expand the Court’s original jurisdiction 
beyond what was allowed under Article III of the Constitution.149 “Thus, while the 
views of those closest to the process that led to and followed the framing of the 
Constitution may provide insight into its meaning, the views of [the First] Congress 
                                                             
138 Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 60 (1926)). 
139 See Bhargava, supra note 118, at 1777–78. 
140 Id. at 1774–75. 
141 See Lund, supra note 5, at 1184. 
142 Id.; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 24 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
143 Lund, supra note 5, at 1184.  
144 Steven Kreis, Thomas Paine, 1737–1809, THE HISTORY GUIDE: LECTURES ON 
MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (May 30, 2013), http://www.historyguide.org/ 
intellect/paine.html [https://perma.cc/FF4S-79XZ]. 
145 Lund, supra note 5, at 1184 (citing 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 457 (1950)). 
146 Lund, supra note 5, at 1184. 
147 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 602 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
148 Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First 
Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. 
L. REV. 847, 868 (2010). 
149 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138, 147 (1803); James E. Pfander, Marbury, 
Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1515, 1589 (2001). 
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or of its individual members cannot provide irrebuttable evidence of the ‘meaning’ 
of the Constitution.”150 
Even if the premise that the acts of the First Congress should be given great 
weight is accepted, the actions of the First Congress do not support legislator-led 
prayer, especially not in the way it is more recently presented in Lund and 
Bormuth.151 A search of the records of the First Congress does not show a single 
example of legislator-led prayer, showing that “[t]he Framers apparently relied 
exclusively on chaplain-led prayer to solemnize their proceedings.”152 As stressed 
by the majority in Marsh, the actions of Congress at this early moment in the history 
of the United States surely reveal what the Framers intended the Establishment 
Clause to mean.153 Thus, it is telling not only that they did not give opening 
invocations themselves, but also that they imposed limits on clergy-led prayer to 
ensure that the practice remained religiously neutral.154 The House and Senate 
formed committees to “take under consideration the manner of electing 
chaplains.”155 It was agreed a week later “[t]hat two chaplains of different 
denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, the Senate appoint 
one, and give notice thereof to the House of Representatives, who shall, thereupon, 
appoint the other; which chaplains shall commence their services in the Houses that 
appoint them, but shall interchange weekly.”156 The care taken by the Framers on 
this issue reflects their concern with avoiding even a thought that the government 
favored a single religion.157 There is no other coherent reason why the First Congress 
would have “bound themselves to select chaplains of different denominations and to 
rotate the chaplains so often.”158  
The local governments in Lund and Bormuth took no such precautions and 
risked alienating county residents by showing favoritism to Christianity.159 In 
Jackson County, the commissioners not only endorsed a specific religion, but made 
an intentional decision to control the content of prayers at board meetings by not 
allowing anyone other than a board member to pray.160 At one board meeting, a 
Jackson County Commissioner speculated about what might occur if any county 
resident could lead an opening prayer: 
 
                                                             
150 Brown, supra note 137, at 188 (emphasis added). 
151 See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
152 Id. 
153 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983). 
154 Lund, 863 F.3d at 295 (Motz, J., concurring). 
155 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
156 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
157 Lund, 863 F.3d at 295 (Motz, J., concurring). 
158 Id. 
159 Id.; Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 537–38 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Moore, J., dissenting). 
160 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 537–38 (Moore, J. dissenting). 
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We all know that any one . . . could go online and become an ordained 
minister in about ten minutes. Um, so if somebody from the public wants 
to come before us and say that they are an ordained minister we are going 
to have to allow them as well . . . . I think we are opening a Pandora’s Box 
here because you are going to get members of the public who are going to 
come up at public comment and we are going to create a lot of problems 
here when certain people come up here and say things that they are not 
going to like.161 
 
These comments show that the board was limiting who could give prayers to 
control the content of invocations.162 To say, as did the Sixth Circuit en banc, that 
such a prayer practice comports with the actions of the First Congress ignores the 
care taken by the Framers to avoid even the appearance of a sectarian preference. In 
brief, the prayer practices in Lund and Bormuth are completely different from what 
was authorized by the First Congress. Because of this, prayer practices like these 
can be “cast aside” without disrupting more than “two centuries of national 
practice.”163  
 
3.  Specific Historical Examples of Legislator-Led Prayer 
 
As noted by The Bormuth majority, the Lund dissent, and Justice Thomas in his 
dissent from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Lund, there is some 
historical evidence of legislator-led prayer in the United States.164 In 1776, 
“Reverend Mr. Turquand,” a member of the South Carolina Provincial Congress, 
performed “divine service” prior to some sessions of the Congress.165 As Justice 
Thomas acknowledges, these instances of legislator-led prayer were “prior to 
Independence” and certainly long before the drafting and adoption of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.166 Using a few references to “divine service”167 
being offered by one legislator in one state prior to the signing of the United States 
Constitution or the adoption of the Bill of Rights seems like an attempt by Justice 
Thomas and the en banc Sixth Circuit to find historical support that simply is not 
there. 
                                                             
161 Cty. of Jackson, supra note 91, at 37:47–38:16. 
162 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 538 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
163 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
164 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2566–66 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); see also Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Rowan County, North Carolina at 8, Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268 (2017) (No. 05-
1631) [hereinafter Brief for Members of Congress]. 
165 Brief for Members of Congress, supra note 164, at 8 (citing 1 JOURNAL OF THE 
PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1776, at 35, 52, 75 (1776)). 
166 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2566 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
167 1 JOURNAL OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1776, at 21–75 
(1776) (showing only four references to “divine service” being offered in the Congress). 
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The other evidence cited by Justice Thomas, that West Virginia and Illinois 
started their state constitutional conventions with invocations led by legislators, is 
also not persuasive evidence to back up his claim that “[f]or as long as this country 
has had legislative prayer, legislators have led it.”168 The Constitutional Convention 
for the State of Illinois took place in 1818169 and the West Virginia Convention did 
not begin until November 1861.170 The inquiry of courts in legislative prayer cases 
must focus on “whether the prayer practice . . . fits within the tradition long followed 
in Congress and the state legislatures.”171 Practices that date back to the time of the 
Framers have unique importance within this inquiry.172 As outlined above, 
legislator-led prayer is not a part of the “tradition long followed in Congress . . . .”173 
The states also do not have a long tradition of legislator-led prayer.174  
Though legislator-led prayer has recently become prevalent in many states,175 
Justice Thomas was only able to point to two concrete examples of states (West 
Virginia and Illinois) that have a long history of legislator-led prayer.176 Even these 
examples, the best historical evidence that can be gathered by proponents of 
legislator-led prayer, do not come close to dating back to the time of the Founding 
Fathers. As colorfully noted by a concurring Judge in Lund, these historical instances 
of legislator-led prayer are “very thin gruel” when compared to the historical 
tradition of clergy-led prayer discussed in Marsh and Town of Greece and are 
“certainly no substitute for the Framers’ own practice and understandings.”177 
 
B.  Prayer Practices Similar to Those Evaluated in Lund and Bormuth Pose  
a Greater Threat to the Democratic Process than Clergy-Led Prayer 
 
The Lund majority reasoned that “[l]egislator-led prayer is not inherently 
unconstitutional,”178 but simply that, as the above discussion of history indicates, 
                                                             
168 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2566 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
169 See Ill. State Historical Soc’y, The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1818, 6 J. 
ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 327, 327 (1913), http://www.archive.org/stream/journalishs06illiuoft# 
page/n351/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/MK62-2EEJ]. 
170 W. Va. Dept. of Arts, Culture, & Hist., West Virginia Constitutional Convention, 
W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statehood11.html 
[https://perma.cc/8EAE-WFYN]. 
171 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014). 
172 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–91 (1983). 
173 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577; see discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
174 See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
175 Brief for Members of Congress, supra note 164, at 10 (noting that, as of 2002, 
legislators lead at least some prayers in thirty-one states).  
176 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S.Ct. 2564, 2566 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
177 Lund, 863 F.3d at 294 (Motz, J., concurring). 
178 Id. at 280 (majority opinion). 
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“the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional inquiry.”179 Because 
the historical tradition relied upon in Marsh and Town of Greece cannot support 
legislator-led prayer, other tools must be used to evaluate such prayer practices.180 
As a separate prong of analysis, courts in legislative prayer cases must conduct a 
“fact-sensitive” review of “the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to 
whom it is directed.”181 Within this fact-sensitive inquiry, the content of prayers is 
often not of concern to judges,182 but the Establishment Clause does constrain the 
content of even clergy-led prayers to some extent.183 The Establishment Clause does 
not allow prayers that “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten 
damnation, preach conversion, proselytize, or advance or disparage a particular 
faith.184 Thus, legislative prayers that include any of the listed characteristics can 
violate the Establishment Clause even if they are clergy-led.185 In addition, it is a 
core principle of the First Amendment that governments may not coerce citizens “to 
support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”186 The following sections will 
examine these issues to show that prayer practices like those used in Lund and 
Bormuth are not constitutionally permissible, and that legislator-led prayer in 
general creates greater potential for Establishment Clause problems. 
 
1.  The Setting of Legislative Prayer and Coercion 
 
Distinct from Marsh, which dealt with clergy-led prayer in a state legislature, 
the facts of Lund and Bormuth involve legislator-led prayers in local town 
meetings.187 Town of Greece made clear that, at least in the context of clergy-led 
prayer, it makes no constitutional difference whether the prayers are offered in a 
state legislature or a local town board meeting.188 In her dissent, Justice Kagan 
sharply criticized this view.189 Justice Kagan would have distinguished the Marsh 
practice of prayers in a state legislature directed primarily at the lawmakers from 
what occurred in Town of Greece.190 She noted that in Marsh, the prayers were an 
internal act for the benefit the lawmakers, a practice completely different from Town 
of Greece where “[a] chaplain face[d] the Town’s residents—with the Board 
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180 See id. at 279–81; see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581–83 
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watching from on high—and call[ed] on them to pray together.”191 Justice Kagan 
and three other members of the Supreme Court found legislative prayer in the 
“highly intimate” setting of a town meeting problematic even when clergy-led.192 
What occurred in Lund and Bormuth is even more troubling. First, it seems 
clear that the prayers offered in Rowan and Jackson county town meetings were not 
solely for the benefit of lawmakers.193 The Bormuth majority’s statement that 
“[l]egislative prayer exists ‘largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers 
and connect them to a tradition dating back to the time of the Framers’”194 simply 
does not reflect the way prayer was being used in these counties. Video evidence 
from Jackson County meetings shows that the town commissioners offered prayers 
at every single board meeting “except the one that no members of the public 
attended.”195 Second, legislator-led prayer as it was practiced in Lund and Bormuth 
can alienate citizens from the local democratic process.196 Citizens attend local 
government meetings to “participate in democracy” and to petition the town’s 
elected representatives for rights and benefits.197 In Lund, these citizen petitions 
occurred shortly after the invocation given by a board member.198 Non-Christian 
citizens attending a town meeting with the hopes of addressing meaningful local 
issues may face the choice of participating in a prayer practice they do not believe 
in or offending the very government leader that they will soon be attempting to 
persuade.199  
Addressing the specific situation of town board meetings, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Town of Greece envisioned certain hypothetical situations that would 
make a town’s prayer practice coercive.200 After determining that the prayer practice 
in Town of Greece was not coercive, Justice Kennedy explained that “[t]he analysis 
would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in the 
prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions 
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”201 These 
issues might have been hypothetical in Town of Greece, but they became reality for 
the citizens involved in Lund and Bormuth. The first time that Peter Bormuth raised 
his concerns about legislator-led prayer in a board meeting, a commissioner “made 
                                                             
191 Id. at 634. 
192 Id. at 627–36. 
193 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 530 (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
194 Id. at 511 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).  
195 Id. at 530 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
196 See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
197 Id. at 287. 
198 Id. at 288. 
199 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 541 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 628–32 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (expressing that for non-
Christians in these situations, the choice between simply praying alongside the majority and 
risking offense by leaving the room can be extremely difficult). 
200 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion). 
201 Id. 
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a disgusted face” at him and “turned his chair around, refusing to listen.”202 On a 
separate occasion, a board member called Bormuth a “nitwit” for voicing objection 
the town prayer practice.203 In Lund, a citizen that questioned the board’s prayer 
practice was “booed and jeered by her fellow citizens.”204  
As already noted, the town board members in both of these cases were giving 
the prayers and in charge of directing the public to participate.205 The Fourth Circuit 
weighed these factors appropriately in holding that “Rowan County’s prayer practice 
violated the Establishment Clause.”206 The Sixth Circuit, dealing with government 
conduct that was arguably more coercive and egregious, explained it away by stating 
that the board members were not expressing antagonism for Bormuth’s religious 
beliefs, but simply reacting to Bormuth’s negative attitude toward them.207 In sum, 
in addition to falling outside of the historical tradition delineated in Marsh, the 
insults, heckling, and government direction over prayer present in Lund and 
Bormuth coerced and intimidated citizens in violation of the principles outlined in 
Town of Greece. Compounding these concerns, the commissioners in both these 
cases “maintained exclusive and complete control over the content of the prayers”208 
by prohibiting anyone other than town board members from offering invocations.209 
 
2.  The Content of Prayers 
 
“If members of a legislative body recite[] one religion’s creed month after 
month, year after year, allowing no opportunity for members of any other religion 
to lead a prayer, a reasonable observer c[an] only conclude that the legislative body 
prefer[s] that religion over all others.”210 According to the plaintiffs in Lund, the 
almost exclusively Christian prayers given by Rowan County Commissioners “sent 
a message that the County and Board favor[ed] Christians . . . .”211 Courts analyzing 
these issues often downplay the effect of prayer and religious practices on listeners 
                                                             
202 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
203 Cty. of Jackson, supra note 91, at 43:29–43:40. 
204 Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 288 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
205 Id. at 272 (“After calling the meeting to order, the chairperson asks everyone in 
attendance—commissioners and constituents alike—to stand up. All five Board members 
rise and bow their heads, along with most of the attendees. A commissioner then asks the 
community to join him in worship, using phrases such as . . . ‘Please pray with me.’”); 
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (“Following a call to order, the Board’s Chairman typically 
requests Commissioners and the public alike to . . . ‘Please bow your heads and let us 
pray’. . . .”). 
206 Lund, 863 F.3d at 275. 
207 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 518. 
208 Lund, 863 F.3d at 274; see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 538 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
209 Lund, 863 F.3d at 273; Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498. 
210 Lund, 863 F.3d at 293 (Motz, J., concurring) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
430 (1962)). 
211 Lund, 863 F.3d at 274. 
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and participants.212 Politically conscious citizens are not being “hypersensitive”213 
for objecting to years of exclusively Christian prayers, but merely expressing a core 
part of who they are.214 Contrary to the Town of Greece majority view, the content 
of prayers does matter. Phrases like “the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross, 
[and] . . . the plan of redemption that is fulfilled in Jesus Christ”215 are “statements 
of profound belief and deep meaning” to the prayer-giver.216  
Maintaining that the content of prayers in government meetings plays only a 
minor role in the constitutional analysis trivializes the beliefs of devout religious 
people who truly believe that they are communicating with a divine being. To 
prayer-givers in these instances, the content of individual prayers is of supreme 
importance,217 but listeners are simply expected to deal with whatever comes, even 
when prayers are clearly advocating that others in the community take up a particular 
faith.218 This can cause citizens to feel excluded from their communities and the 
local political process.219 In brief, though the content of legislative prayers is not 
dispositive,220 it is much more important where government leaders are the only 
prayer-givers and prayers are used to advance a particular faith. 
 
V.  OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Many cities and counties around the United States rely on legislator-led prayer 
because it is convenient and less expensive than retaining a full-time chaplain,221 and 
two en banc circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions on the issues discussed 
above.222 Both Rowan County and Peter Bormuth appealed these rulings,223 but 
despite the direct conflict between the rulings of the two circuits, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in both cases in June 2018.224 Because of this denial of certiorari 
                                                             
212 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 589–90 (2014). 
213 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
214 See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 635–36 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
215 Examples of phrases used in the prayers at issue in Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 
(2014).  
216 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 635 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
217 See, e.g., Bormuth, 870 F.3d 494, 518 (en banc) (quoting a Jackson County 
Commissioner as saying “[w]e commissioners, as individuals, have a right to pray as we 
believe”). 
218 Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 287 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (concluding that 
several prayers said by the Rowan County Commissioners “placed Christianity on a higher 
plane than other faiths and urged attendees to embrace that religion”). 
219 Id. at 274. 
220 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 580–81. 
221 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 
(2018) (No 17-565).  
222 Id.  
223 Id. at 1; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 138 S. Ct. 
2708, 2708 (2018) (No 17-7220). 
224 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (denying certiorari); Bormuth v. 
Cty. of Jackson, 138 S.Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (denying certiorari). 
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“[s]tate and local lawmakers can lead prayers in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
Michigan, but not in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, or West 
Virginia.”225 A Supreme Court ruling will eventually be necessary to provide state 
and local officials with guidance on this issue,226 but until the Court steps in to 
resolve the conflict, federal courts in other circuits have a variety of avenues 
available for dealing with challenges to legislator-led prayer practices. 
 
A.  Analysis Using the Marsh and Town of Greece Frameworks 
 
The most likely course of action for federal courts outside of the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits in legislator-led prayer challenges would be rulings using the analysis 
of Marsh and Town of Greece. Even if courts were to determine that the identity of 
the prayer-giver is not dispositive to the constitutional equation, prayer practices like 
those in Lund and Bormuth should still be considered unconstitutional because they 
coerce participation by all present and actively promote the practice and spread of 
Christianity.227 More far-reaching rulings would track the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, 
recognizing the clear differences between legislator-led and clergy-led prayer 
practices, and hold legislator-led prayer practices like those in Lund and Bormuth to 
be violations of the Establishment Clause. The Town of Greece majority opinion 
would allow for this type of ruling.228 It noted that the main issue in legislative prayer 
cases is to determine whether the prayer practice “fits within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”229  
Evidence of long-standing tradition is part of this analysis, but key to the inquiry 
is whether the tradition dates back to the time of the Framers.230 If other federal 
courts recognize a meaningful difference between legislator-led and clergy-led 
prayers coupled with findings of coercion or proselytizing, the inquiry would almost 
certainly end there, and practices like those used in Rowan and Jackson counties 
would be held unconstitutional under Town of Greece.231 If, on the other hand, courts 
are presented with situations where the practice is not coercive or are unwilling to 
recognize the relevance of “subtle coercive pressures” to the legislative prayer 
                                                             
225 Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2567 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
226 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 221, at 25. 
227 See infra Section IV.B (referencing the coercive nature of the prayer practices at 
issue in Lund and Bormuth). 
228 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576–79. 
229 Id. at 577. 
230 Id. at 588 (plurality opinion) (providing that the “purpose [of legislative prayer] is 
largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a tradition 
dating to the time of the Framers”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–91 (1983) (noting 
the unique importance of evidence that a practice dates back to the time of the Framers). 
231 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 584–86. 
732 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
analysis,232 it is plausible that they would turn to a traditional Establishment Clause 
test to resolve the issue. 
 
B.  Applying the Lemon Test to Legislator-Led Prayer 
 
It may seem unlikely that lower federal courts would use the Lemon test for a 
legislative prayer case in the future, but it is not out of the question. Marsh “carv[ed] 
out an exception” to the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence by 
not subjecting it to any of the formal tests in use at the time.233 The Marsh Court 
found those tests unnecessary because government bodies dating back to the First 
Congress have started meetings with clergy-led prayer, assuring that the practice is 
compatible with the Establishment Clause.234 A historical tradition analysis has been 
used by the Supreme Court in other Establishment Clause cases, but only when 
dealing with passive government displays that were supported by historical 
tradition.235  
Contrary to the assertion of the Bormuth majority, applying the Lemon test to 
the issue of legislator-led prayer would not be “rewriting thirty-plus years of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence,”236 because Marsh and Town of Greece were 
addressing a completely different issue than the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.237 History 
should be used to analyze legislative prayer when the practice actually has a history 
that dates back to the time of the Framers. Though the Lemon test has not been 
applied with rigid consistency by federal courts,238 it is still recognized as a key part 
of the analysis in many Establishment Clause cases.239  
Under the Lemon test, “a governmental practice violates the Establishment 
Clause if it (1) lacks a legitimate secular purpose; (2) has the primary effect of 
                                                             
232 This might happen if, for example, a lower federal court were to accept Justice 
Thomas’s view that “to the extent coercion is relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, 
it is actual legal coercion that counts—not subtle coercive pressures” Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
233 Id. at 575 (majority opinion). 
234 Id.; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (“[C]learly the men who wrote the First 
Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains . . . as a violation of that 
Amendment . . . .”). 
235 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (using history to analyze whether 
a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol created an Establishment 
Clause violation). 
236 Contra Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 514 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
237 See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 292 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
238 See, e.g., Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
that the Lemon test continues to “stalk[] our Establishment Clause jurisprudence” like “some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, 
after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .” (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
239 See Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 603–09; see generally McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of 
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (applying the Lemon test). 
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advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fosters an excessive entanglement with 
religion.”240 In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Brennan applied Lemon to the Nebraska 
legislature’s prayer practice and determined that it violated all three elements.241 It 
was “self-evident” to him that the purpose of legislative prayer was not secular, but 
religious.242 It is not clear whether this assertion would hold up in all legislative 
prayer cases today, because the Supreme Court stated in Town of Greece that 
legislative prayer exists “largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers 
and connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”243 Whether this 
purpose would be considered secular is unclear, but when legislative prayers are not 
for the benefit of lawmakers at all, the analysis is easier.  
The prayers in Lund and Bormuth were at least partly directed at the members 
of the public that were present at town meetings.244 In Bormuth, the board of 
commissioners prayed at every meeting over a two-year span except the one where 
no members of the public were present, undermining the argument that legislator-
led prayer is primarily for the benefit of lawmakers.245 Justice Brennan also observed 
that the primary effect of legislative prayer is advancing religion.246 Prayers in 
government settings explicitly link religious beliefs to the power of the State, and 
even if citizens can choose not to participate, they place coercive pressure on 
religious minorities.247 It is important to note that Justice Brennan was referencing 
clergy-led prayer in his dissent, but his concerns about coercion and linking religion 
to the state are magnified when the prayer-giver is an elected government official 
facing constituent citizens.  
Finally, legislative prayer generally, and certainly legislator-led prayer as it was 
practiced in Lund and Bormuth, “leads to excessive entanglement between the State 
and religion.”248 When a town board opens monthly meetings with prayers given by 
a board member, “there is no distinction between the government and the prayer 
giver: they are one and the same.”249 In addition, legislator-led prayer fosters 
government entanglement with religion because it creates a risk of religious beliefs 
becoming a campaign issue in elections.250 In sum, because historical tradition does 
                                                             
240 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). 
241 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797–801 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
242 Id. at 797. 
243 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 588 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
244 Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (noting that the 
commissioners sit at the front of a room facing their constituents and a member of the board 
stands up and asks the community to join him in worship); see Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 
870 F.3d 494, 530 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
245 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 530 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
246 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 537 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
250 Lund, 863 F.3d at 282 (“[T]he prayer practice became a campaign issue in the 2016 
Board elections”). 
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not support legislator-led prayer, federal courts hearing legislator-led prayer 
challenges could apply the Lemon test and hold that prayer practices similar to those 
in Lund and Bormuth violate the Establishment Clause. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In a time of ever-increasing division along political and religious lines,251 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting remarks in Town of Greece about what the Establishment 
Clause should guarantee ring true: “[w]hen the citizens of this country approach their 
government, they do so only as Americans, not as members of one faith or another. 
And that means that even in a partly legislative body, they should not confront 
government-sponsored worship that divides them along religious lines.”252 
Legislator-led prayer as it was practiced in Lund and Bormuth impermissibly leads 
to treatment of citizens solely as members of faiths in a way that clergy-led prayer 
does not. Because the historical tradition relied on in Marsh and Town of Greece 
cannot save legislator-led prayer practices where the legislators reserve prayer 
opportunities exclusively for themselves, federal courts should adopt the view taken 
in Lund and recognize that the identity of the prayer-givers in legislative meetings 
is relevant to the legislative prayer analysis. 
                                                             
251 See generally Tara Isabella Burton, Christianity in America Is More Politically 
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